So now we have an Asean Code of Conduct on the settlement of disputes in the South China Sea. Thanks to the 36 hour shuttle diplomacy of Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natelagawa immediately  after the 10 member regional grouping ended its 45th regular Foreign Ministers  Meeting in Phom Pehn without the customary joint communiqué last week, it has now come out with a six point “core position” on the issue which was considered  the centerpiece of that meeting, which is just as well.
It would have been truly embarrassing if not downright unacceptable to have left the matter hanging and  the bitter debates somehow unresolved. That would have placed the standing of the group in jeopardy and its efficacy as a regional body under a cloud.
Said Natelagawa: “The 10 members have agreed on the components of an Asean “instrument” which would detail what was agreed upon during last week’s Asean Regional Forum in Phnom Pehn, including the maritime dispute. We are trying so that other decisions made by the foreign ministers will be formulated in a different instrument for follow up.The non-existence of a joint communiqué is behind us now.”
We recall that last week we had advised that the insistence of the Philippines and Vietnam, two members which have existing claims over areas in the South China, to include specific reference to the running stand off they have with China over the said areas, sank the communiqué since that was objected to by the Cambodia, the host country, and two or three other members which noted that “it would have been like pouring gasoline on fire,” as Natelagawa’s shuttle diplomacy illustrated the discord which led to the non-issuance of the communiqué could have been avoided. How so? Because the “common position” which was eventually agreed to by all members was in fact already on the table and ready to be issued during the Phnom Pehn meeting. No less that the host and Asean chairman, Cambodia, had urged  the members to sign on the six point plan and leave any mention about the current stand offs for discussion at some other time.
Apparently, our very own Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del  Rosario and his Vietnamese counterpart would not have anything to do with that.
No less than Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong noted:
“Cambodia is not at fault at all. Why was the foreign ministers meeting unable to issue communiqué on these six points which were all raised by me? Why did two countries keep opposing? Probably, there was a plan behind the scenes against Cambodia.”
Namhong advised that contrary to Del Rosario’s advisory he “could not accept that the joint statement has become hostage to the bilateral issue between the Philippines and China.”
Indonesian Foreign Minister Talegawa together with his Singaporean counterpart tried very hard to “broker” a possible “win-win” solution on the wording of the communiqué by suggesting only that “any disputes should be avoided at all times and that the countries look forward to the signing of a code of conduct on the settlement of such disputes.” But that was also rejected.
We understood then where Del Rosario and Vietnam’s top diplomat were coming from. And we continue to listen to him despite his “after-the-fact” campaign to point a finger and insist on a his losing proposition. He and his Vietnamese partner  wanted  to highlight their respective positions on the issue and for the body to support them in detailing  the whys and wherefores of the current disputes, which was expected of them. But for some reason that was resisted by the chairman, in which case and as expected by the other members anyway, the duo should have been sensitive enough to take pause and find some “common ground” to save the meeting from ending in disarray. That did not materialize at all as both came out piping hot after the conclave.
But, ever the pragmatic diplomat that he turned out to be, Natelagawa persisted and proffered a way out of the impasse suggesting in the process that “ it is very important for us to express concern with what happened whether it be at the shoals or the continental shelves, but more importantly than simply responding to the past is to move forward to ensure that these kinds of events no longer occur”
Again, his and his Singaporean counterpart’s efforts to bridge the gap, so to speak, right there and then was not good enough. It had to take him 36 hours shuttling back and forth among the capitals of the contending parties to get a deal.
To give one and all an idea where the conflict was we are quoting below the suggested wordings advised by Del Rosario himself who was the principal advocate of a  more direct, stringent and specific rules based framework within the ambit of existing UN issuances: “In this context, we discussed in depth the recent developments in the South China Sea (RP insertion: Including the situation in the Scarborough Shoal), and expressed serious concern over such development in the area (RP insertion: Particularly those contrary to the provisions of the 1982 UNCLoS related to the exclusive economic zone and continental shelves of coastal states.) In this connection, we called on all parties to respect (RP insertion: The exclusive economic zone and continental shelves of coastal states) as well the freedom of navigation in and over flights over the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLoS.”
Unfortunately, the meeting’s chairman, Cambodia, perhaps in a bid to have a more realistic agreement signed during the meeting insisted on excluding what it called “contentious references.” Instead, he proposed the “six point core position” part of which is as stated above which Natelagawa then took hold of and proceeded to find consensus on immediately after the meeting. That “common position” is actually an improvement over the existing arrangements now in place which Asean and China have agreed upon.
As Natalegawa correctly stated “more importantly than simply responding to the past is to move forward to ensure that these kinds of events no longer occur,” which is what eventually happened with the signing of this six point core position.
Why Del Rosario held out and waited for things to unravel before grudgingly agreeing anyway remains a mystery up to this point.